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Statement Regarding Oral Argument 
The relevant law is well-settled. The deficiencies of Appellants’ 
pleading are apparent. Oral argument is not needed to resolve this appeal.  
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Abbreviations and Record References 
 “Adler” refers to Plaintiffs-Appellants Jim S. Adler, P.C. and Jim 
Adler, collectively. 
  “The Adler Firm” refers to Jim S. Adler, P.C. 
 “McNeil” refers to the Defendants-Appellees, collectively.  
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 Issues Presented 
 The overarching question in this appeal is whether Adler stated a 
viable Lanham Act claim for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition. That question, in turn, presents these issues: 
 1. Search term purchases. It is well-settled in this Circuit, and 
nationally, that the mere purchase of branded keywords to generate online 
advertisements does not violate the Lanham Act. Does this line of authority 
foreclose Adler’s claims in this case? 
 2. Generic terms. It is undisputed that McNeil did not place any 
search engine ads that displayed Adler’s trademarks. The ads contained only 
generic terms that, by Adler’s own admission, describe any personal injury 
firm. Did Adler fail to state a viable infringement claim about ads that only 
contained generic terms and not his trademarks?  
 3. Digits of confusion. After the district court concluded that Adler 
had failed to state a claim, was it still required to conduct an unnecessary 
“digits-of-confusion” analysis about that meritless claim? 
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 4. Amendment. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Adler’s motion for leave to amend?    
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Statement of the Case 
A. Factual background  
 Jim Adler and the Adler Firm (collectively, “Adler”) were among the 
first lawyers and law firms to advertise extensively after the Supreme Court 
upheld the right of lawyers to advertise in 1977. (ROA.86-ROA.87.) Adler 
has used several trademarks in its advertising, including JIM ADLER, THE 
HAMMER, THE TEXAS HAMMER, and EL MARTILLO TEJANO 
(collectively, the “Adler Marks”). (ROA.88 ¶19.) The Adler Marks are 
registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. (ROA.88 ¶22.) 
 Adler’s current advertising strategy includes the purchase of 
“keywords,” through Google’s search engine, to generate advertisements 
designed to drive internet traffic to the Adler Firm’s website. (ROA.91-
ROA.92.) An advertiser who buys a keyword is paying to reserve a 
particular word or phrase—called a keyword—that would trigger the 
display of its ad if that term came up in response to a Google search. See, e.g., 
1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(describing the “mechanics of Internet advertising through search engines”).  
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 For example, Adler buys keywords for the phrases “Jim Adler” or 
“Texas Hammer,” as well as the phrase “car accident lawyer” for more 
generic searches. (ROA.91 ¶37.) Those keywords generate search-engine ads 
that prominently include the Adler Marks and clearly identify the Adler 
Firm as the source of the advertisement, as shown in this example: 
 
(ROA.92 ¶38.)   
 Appellee Lauren Von McNeil is the sole owner of Appellees McNeil 
Consultants and Quintessa Marketing, both doing business as “Accident 
Injury Legal Center.” (ROA.93.) They both operate a lawyer-referral website 
at accidentinjurylegalcenter.com, as well as a call center associated with that 
site. (ROA.93.) Through that website and call center, those businesses solicit 
and refer personal injury cases to lawyers with whom they have a referral 
agreement, for which they receive referral fees. (ROA.93.)  
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 McNeil purchases the Adler Marks as keywords through Google’s 
search engine on mobile devices, which Google then uses to serve click-to-
call advertisements. (ROA.93.) The practice of buying a competitor’s 
trademark as a search engine keyword has become common in the world of 
internet advertising,1 and, the law is settled that this practice alone does not 
state a valid claim for trademark infringement. See infra at 23-28. The State 
Bar of Texas recently reviewed the practice and found that it does not violate 
Texas’s attorney ethics rules. See Professional Ethics Committee for the State 
Bar of Texas, Opinion No. 661 (July 2016).  
 A “click-to-call” ad targets mobile devices; instead of linking to a 
website when the user taps on the ad, a click-to-call ad causes the device to 
call a predetermined phone number. (ROA.85 ¶9.) As a result, Google 
searches for “Jim Adler,” “The Texas Hammer,” and “El Martillo Tejano” 
result in search pages that display Defendants’ ads. They are plainly 
 
1 See Daniel Malachowski, Search Engine Trade-Marketing: Why Trademark Owners Cannot 
Monopolize Use of Their Marks in Paid SEARCH, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 
369, 369 (2012) (explaining that “[i]t is common for competitors … to bid on others’ 
marks.”). 
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labeled—in bold—as ads. They indicate McNeil’s website as the source. 
They do not contain Adler’s trademarks in whole or part: 
           
(ROA.94 ¶44.)  
 Rather than identifying any specific lawyer of firm as the source, or 
displaying the Adler Marks, McNeil’s online click-to-call ads simply display 
generic terms that consumers might associate with any personal injury firm. 
(ROA.193.) Consumers who select the click-to-call link are connected to a 
call center operated by McNeil. (ROA.194.)  
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B. This litigation 
 Adler sued, alleging federal-law claims for trademark infringement 
and unfair competition, along with related state-law causes of action. 
(ROA.84 ¶ 1.)2 McNeil moved to dismiss. (ROA.115.)  
 After full briefing, Magistrate Judge David Horan issued findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation on August 10, 2020. 
(ROA.189.) He concluded that because Adler “failed to state a federal claim 
on which relief may be granted,” the district judge “should dismiss the 
federal claims in the amended complaint with prejudice and decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” 
(ROA.207.)  
 
2 That same day, Adler filed three other, similar lawsuits against other, unrelated parties. 
Two settled not long after filing: Jim S. Adler PC et al. v. Alliance Injury Group LLC et al., 
No. 3:19-cv-2023-B (N.D. Tex.) (Boyle, J.), and Jim S. Adler PC et al. v. Law Street Marketing 
LLC et al., No. 3:19-cv-2026-E (Brown, J.). In the third, Judge Kinkeade accepted 
Magistrate Judge Horan’s recommendation to dismiss Adler’s claims for 
misappropriation of name or likeness and misappropriation of business opportunity, and 
otherwise denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Jim S. Adler PC et al. v. Angel L. 
Reyes & Associates PC, No. 3:19-cv-02027-K-BN (N.D. Tex.). In that case—unlike this one—
the resulting Google ads displayed the term “hammer,” a component of some Adler 
Marks. See Adler v. Reyes, 2020 WL 5099596 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2020), adopted, 2020 
WL 5094678 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2020).  
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 Adler objected and moved for leave to amend his complaint. 
(ROA.209, ROA.262.) Judge Ed Kinkeade denied the motion for leave, 
finding that the proposed amendment did not solve the substantive 
problems with Adler’s claims. He otherwise adopted Magistrate Judge 
Horan’s opinion, and entered judgment accordingly. (ROA.307, ROA.309.) 
This appeal followed. (ROA.310.)    
Summary of the Argument 
 The trial court correctly dismissed Adler’s complaint for two 
independent, mutually-reinforcing reasons.  
 Search term purchases. A well-established line of authority holds that 
the mere purchase of branded keywords to generate online ads does not 
violate the Lanham Act. The trial court correctly applied this line of authority 
to dismiss Adler’s complaint. In so doing, it correctly refused to give any 
weight to Adler’s conclusory allegations about a purported “scheme” by 
McNeil. Those allegations were insufficient to state a claim for “initial-
interest confusion,” or any other violation of federal trademark law.  
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 Generic terms. McNeil’s ads do not display, contain, or otherwise refer 
to Adler’s trademarked terms. Adler sued about McNeil ads that contained 
generic terms that Adler admits may be associated “with any personal injury 
firm.” The trial court correctly held that the Lanham Act does not protect 
such generic terms, and properly dismissed Adler’s complaint for this 
additional reason.  
 Digits of confusion. After the district court concluded that Adler had 
failed to state a claim, it was not required to conduct an unnecessary “digits-
of-confusion” analysis about that meritless claim. Because Adler did not 
allege any actionable misuse of a trademark or confusingly-similar term, 
there is nothing to analyze. Absent misuse of a trademarked term, or a 
confusingly-similar term in the text of the ad, there is simply no liability.  
 Amendment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Adler’s motion for leave to amend. The proposed amendment did not 
resolve the substantive problems with the dismissed complaint.  




This court reviews de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex 
Capital, Inc., 976 F.3d 585, 588 (5th Cir. 2020). “To survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)). “[T]hreadbare factual allegations, along with … conclusory 
recitation of the elements of a claim … are insufficient to state a plausible 
claim for relief.” Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 528, 534 
(5th Cir. 2020).  
The trial court correctly applied two well-settled principles in 
dismissing Adler’s complaint. First, the Lanham Act is not violated just by 
bidding on trademarked terms to generate internet search results. Second, 
the Lanham Act does not let a party claim a legal monopoly on common 
English-language words. Those principles are fatal to Adler’s claim, whether 
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styled as one for “initial-interest confusion” or otherwise. The trial court’s 
dismissal should be affirmed.  
A. The purchase of trademarked terms for use as search-engine 
keywords does not violate the Lanham Act.  
 Adler alleged that “[t]o carry out their scheme, Defendants purchase 
the ADLER Marks as keyword advertisements on mobile devices through 
Google’s search engine and uses [sic] them in connection with a ‘click-to-call’ 
advertisement.” (ROA.93 ¶43; see also ROA.94 ¶46 (describing the bidding 
process for such ads)).  But the law is settled, both in this Circuit3 and 
nationally,4 that the mere act of buying a competitor’s trademark as a 
 
3 See College Network, Inc. v. Moore Educ. Publishers, Inc., 378 F. App’x 403, 414 (5th Cir. 
2010) (clarifying that the purchase of a competitor’s brand as a search-engine keyword to 
summon sponsored-link advertising “does not compel a finding of likelihood of 
confusion under the relevant Fifth Circuit law”); Tempur-Pedic N. Am., LLC v. Mattress 
Firm, Inc., Civil Action H-17-1068, 2017 WL 2957912, at *7-*8 (S.D. Tex. July 11, 2017) (“The 
mere purchase of AdWords alone, without directing a consumer to a potentially 
confusing web page, is not sufficient for a claim of trademark infringement.’); see also 
Mary Kay v. Weber, 661 F. Supp.2d 632, 646 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (Fish, J.) (refusing to enjoin a 
defendant from keyword bidding even after a finding of willful infringement).   
4 See, e.g., Alzheimer’s Disease & Related Disorders Ass’n, Inc. v. Alzheimer’s Found. Of Am., 
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 260, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Virtually no court has held that, on its own, 
a defendant’s purchase of a plaintiff’s mark as a keyword term is sufficient for liability.”); 
(citing 1–800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp.2d 1151, 1174 (D. Utah 2010), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013); Stephen T. Greenberg, 
M.D., P.C. v. Perfect Body Image, LLC, 2019 WL 3485700, *7 (E.D. N.Y. 2019), report and 
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keyword for search-engine advertising does not state a valid claim for 
trademark infringement. Indeed, the principle is so well-settled that 
Google’s own trademark policy states: “We don’t investigate or restrict 
trademarks as keywords.”5  
 Adler admits the force of this authority. See Brief of Appellants 
[“Brief”] at 24 (“There is no dispute in this case that the mere purchase of a 
competitor’s mark for keyword searches (e.g., for comparative advertising) 
does not, in itself, give rise to trademark infringement.”).  Unable to avoid 
those cases, Adler tried to evade them by talking about a “bait-and-switch 
scheme.” As the trial court correctly found, however, no such scheme is 
properly alleged—the record shows only “conclusory statements in 
 
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3927367 (E.D. N.Y. 2019) (same); Gen. Steel Domestic 
Sales, LLC v. Chumley, No. 10-CV-1398, 2013 WL 1900562, at *10 (D. Colo. May 7, 2013), 
aff’d, 627 Fed. Appx. 682 (10th Cir. 2015) (the purchase of the term “general steel” as a 
search keyword so that searches incorporating that term would trigger the display of the 
defendant’s ads in the “sponsored links” section of the search results was not sufficient 
to support a trademark violation on the theory of initial interest confusion); Hearts on Fire 
Co., LLC v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 274, 285 (D. Mass. 2009)); see also 5 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR Competition [“MCCARTHY”] § 25A:7 
(5th ed. 2019) (“Almost all District Courts have found that no likelihood of confusion was 
caused by the purchase of keywords alone.”). 
5 “Trademarks – Advertising Policies Help,” 
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6118 (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).  
Case: 20-10936      Document: 00515700693     Page: 24     Date Filed: 01/08/2021
 
25 
[Adler’s] complaint alleging that Defendants’ advertisements are confusing 
….” (ROA.201-ROA.202.)6 (This brief will address those allegations in more 
detail in Part (C), after reviewing the substance of the ads placed by McNeil.) 
The trial court correctly applied this line of cases to dismiss Adler’s 
complaint. (ROA.201.) 
 On this point, Adler also cites two cases from this Court, both of which 
in fact support McNeil. The first is College Network, Inc. v. Moore Educ. 
Publishers, Inc., 378 Fed. App’x 403, 414 n.5 (5th Cir. 2010), in which the jury 
found no infringement from defendant’s purchase of the trademarked term 
“The College Network” as a search engine keyword for sponsored-link 
advertising. 378 Fed. App’x 403, 413. This Court affirmed, holding that “the 
evidence did not compel a finding of likelihood of confusion under the 
 
6 In full, the trial court said: “The purchase of a competitor’s trademark as a keyword for 
search-engine advertising, without more, is insufficient for a claim of trademark 
infringement. … But that is precisely what Plaintiffs allege here. Although they make 
conclusory statements in their complaint alleging that Defendants’ advertisements are 
confusing, they assert no facts to support those claims. And Plaintiffs seemingly concede 
so in their response. They make no substantive response to this issue but detour to 
address Defendants’ one-paragraph argument that Plaintiffs did not state a false 
advertising claim. The undersigned acknowledges that Plaintiffs did not assert a claim 
for false advertising.” (ROA.201-ROA.202 (citations omitted)). 
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relevant Fifth Circuit law.” Id. at 414 & n.5. The second, Southwest Recreational 
Indus., Inc. v. FieldTurf, Inc., No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 32783971 (5th Cir. Aug. 
13, 2002), also affirms a judgment based on a no-infringement verdict, 
noting: “The meta tag cases in which our sister circuits have found 
trademark infringement involve either evidence of customer confusion or 
evidence that the meta tags were used illegitimately.” Id. at *7-*8.  
 Importantly, when Southwest Recreational referred to a “meta tag,” it 
referred to part of the defendant’s website. A “meta tag” is a component in 
the code that, when executed, displays a website’s content to an observer.7 
 
7 A “meta tag” is “an element of HTML that describes the contents of a Web page, and is 
placed near the beginning of the page's source code, and used by search engines to index 
pages by subject.” Collins English Dictionary (2012 Digital Edition), 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/meta--tag (last visited December 28, 2020). See also, 
e.g., “Meta element,” www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_element (last visited January 7, 
2021) (“Meta elements are tags used in HTML and XHTML documents to provide 
structured metadata about a Web page. They are part of a web page's ‘head’ section.”);  
“Meta Tags—How Google Meta Tags Impact SEO,” https://tinyurl.com/y7uyqdjx (last 
visited January 7, 2021) [“Meta Tags”] (“Meta tags are snippets of text that describe a 
page’s content; the meta tags don’t appear on the page itself, but only in the page’s source 
code. Meta tags are essentially little content descriptors that help tell search engines what 
a web page is about.”); see generally “HTML—Meta Tags,” 
www.tutorialspoint.com/html/html_meta_tags.htm.”) (describing the kinds of 
information that a site’s meta tag can convey).  
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Like any other part of that source code, it can be seen with two mouse clicks.8 
 For two related reasons, the holdings of College Network and Southwest 
Recreational support the trial court’s ruling. First, as a general matter, both 
cases require something more than conclusory claims about a “scheme” to 
make ad purchases actionable.9 True, Southwest Recreational acknowledged 
that “initial interest confusion” can establish a Lanham Act violation. Id. at 
*7 (citing Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
But nothing about that label changes the basic pleading requirements of the 
Federal Rules, which Adler failed to satisfy. See infra at 34-37.  
 
8 See “Meta Tags,” supra note 7 (“If you want to find out whether a given page is using 
meta tags, just right-click anywhere on the page and select ‘View Page Source.’ A new 
tab will open in Chrome (in Firefox, it’ll be a pop-up window). The part at the top, or 
‘head’ of the page, is where the meta tags would be.”). For example, the 600Camp blog 
has this general information about the site in some of its meta tags: 
 
www.600camp.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).  
9 Adler also cites America CAN! v. Car Donations Foundation, No. 3:18-CV-1709-G, 2019 WL 
1112667 (N.D. Tex. March 11, 2019), which denied a 12(b)(6) motion for a complaint that 
“does not rely exclusively” on the purchase of trademarked terms. Id. at *9. The cited 
cases, consistent with the above authority from this Court, require something more. Id. 
*10. The trial court here correctly found that Adler did not do so. (ROA.201-ROA.202.)  
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 Second, more specifically, these cases underscore the fact that this 
Circuit has not found “initial-interest confusion” when the ad in question 
does not contain the mark or a confusingly similar version of the mark. In 
the Elvis Presley case, this Court noted how a restaurant named the “Velvet 
Elvis” benefitted from customers who “thought the Defendants’ bar was a 
place that was associated with Elvis Presley ….” 141 F.3d at 204. In Southwest 
Recreational, this Court then acknowledged that precedent but found it 
inapplicable to the facts of that case. 2002 WL 32783971 at *7. And that 
discussion of meta tags was a discussion about the defendant’s 
incorporation of the mark into its allegedly-infringing website, as part of the 
website’s code. See supra at 26-27 & nn.7-8. In contrast, a keyword is not part 
of the disputed ad. See supra at 17-18. Adler cites no case from this Court that 
extends initial-interest confusion beyond an ad that in some way displays or 
incorporates the relevant mark, or something confusingly similar to that 
mark.  
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B. Displaying generic terms in ads does not violate the Lanham Act.  
A trademark-infringement claim requires the plaintiff to “show that 
the defendant’s use of the mark ‘creates a likelihood of confusion in the 
minds of potential customers as to the source, affiliation, or sponsorship of 
the product or service at issue.” Alliance for Good Gov't v. Coal. for Better Gov't, 
901 F.3d 498, 508 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).10 For two related reasons, 
the trial court correctly found that Adler failed to plead a likelihood of 
consumer confusion.11 As a result, no further analysis was required, 
 
10 See also Alliance, 901 F.3d at 508 (“The required showing is a ‘probability’ of confusion, 
not merely a ‘possibility.’”) (emphasis added); see also Viacom Int'l v. IJR Capital 
Investments, L.L.C., 891 F.3d 178, 192 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Word association with [claimant’s 
mark] is insufficient to establish a probable likelihood of confusion, and the court “must 
‘consider the marks in the context that a customer perceives them in the marketplace.’” 
(quoting Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
11 See, e.g., Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming 
dismissal of trademark infringement suit even though the defendant’s advertising 
materials used the plaintiff’s trademark because the alleged facts demonstrated that there 
was no likelihood of confusion and that the fair use defense conclusively applied as a 
matter of law”); Phoenix Entm’t Partners, LLC v. Casey Rd. Food & Beverage, LLC, 728 F. 
App’x 910, 912–13 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of Lanham Act trademark 
infringement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Anago Franchising, Inc. 
v. IMTN, Inc., 477 F. App’x 383, 386 (7th Cir. 2012) (same).  
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including any review of the “digits of confusion,” because there was nothing 
further to analyze. Adler’s complaint was correctly dismissed.  
First, an ad is not likely to confuse a customer about a trademark when 
the ad does not display, contain, or otherwise refer to that trademark. See, 
e.g., 1-800 Contacts, 722 F.3d at 1242-49 (finding no likelihood of confusion 
and observing: “This case is readily distinguishable from [an earlier case] in 
which the alleged infringer used its competitor’s trademarks on its 
websites.”).12 Here, it is undisputed that McNeil’s ads did not contain, 
 
12 See also J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, CIV.A.06-0597, 2007 
WL 30115, at *2, *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss 
plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim under Lanham Act based on the court’s finding 
that there was no likelihood of confusion where the defendant’s ads and links did not 
incorporate the plaintiff’s trademarks in any way); Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC, 95 F. 
Supp. 3d 1170, 1191 (D. Neb. 2015) (denying motion for preliminary injunction based, in 
part, on no showing of a likelihood of confusion where the ads at issue did not use the 
plaintiff’s trademarks and the ad was plainly labeled as a sponsored ad); USA 
Nutraceuticals Group, Inc. v. BPI Sports, LLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2016) 
(denying motion for preliminary injunction based on no likelihood of confusion where 
the defendant purchased the plaintiff’s trademarks as advertising keywords but the 
defendant’s ads did not display the trademarks); Tartell v. South Florida Sinus & Allergy 
Center, Inc., No. 12-cv-61853, 2013 WL 12036430, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2013) (finding 
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s name in Google AdWords not confusingly similar because 
plaintiff’s name did not appear in ad, the ad was offset as a sponsored ads section, and 
the ad clearly identified defendant as the provider); Zerorez Franchising Sys., Inc. v. 
Distinctive Cleaning, Inc., CV 13-2326 ADM/BRT, 2016 WL 2637801, at *8 n.3 (D. Minn. 
May 6, 2016) (noting that “because of the low likelihood of confusion resulting from 
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display, or otherwise refer to any term that Adler had trademarked. See supra 
at 17-18.  
Second, Adler has no trademark claim about generic terms. Adler 
admits that his claims rest solely on the incorporation of “generic terms that 
consumers might associate with any personal injury firm” in McNeil’s ads. 
(ROA.94 ¶45 (emphasis added)). Adler has no valid trademark-infringement 
claim about ads that contain only generic terms. See, e.g., Mil-Mar Shoe Co., 
Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Generic names are 
regarded by the law as free for all to use. They are in the public domain.”) 
(quoting 2 MCCARTHY § 12.01[2] ).13 McNeil, like any other English speaker, 
 
merely employing trademarked phrases in a non-customer facing environment [referring 
to Google Adwords campaigns], such behavior does not constitute trademark 
infringement.”). 
13 See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1986); 
Scooter Store, Inc. v. SpinLife.com, LLC, 2011 WL 6415516, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2011), 
adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WL 4498904 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2012); Kegan v. 
Apple Computer, Inc., 1996 WL 667808, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1996). In Kegan, the owner 
of the registered mark “MacGuide” sued the defendant in connection with its use of the 
marks “Apple Guide” and “Macintosh Guide.” Kegan, 1996 WL 667808, at *1. The 
defendant argued that the suffix “--guide” is generic, such that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to prevent its use by others. Id. at *4. The court agreed, holding that the defendant 
“cannot be said to have infringed on [plaintiff's] MACGUIDE trademark” where the 
generic term “--guide” is “not protectible and [defendant] should be able to use it freely.” 
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has “a right to the use of the English language and … a right to assume that 
nobody is going to take that English language away from [her].” KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122, n.5 
(2004).14 
Trying to skirt this principle and these cases, Adler relies on two cases 
involving the use of trademarks as meta tags to argue that trademark 
visibility is not a requirement for an infringement claim. See Brief at 30 (citing 
Am. CAN!, 2019 WL 1112667 at *9-10, and Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 781 
F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2011)). In both of these district-court cases, the 
defendants actively embedded the plaintiffs’ trademarks into the code of 
their website as meta tags. See Am. CAN!, 2019 WL 1112667 at *9-*10; 
Abraham, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 404. In other words, they took affirmative steps 
 
Id. at *5, *8. The Court also noted that, although “guide” is a part of the plaintiff’s 
trademark Macguide, “Apple may use the term --GUIDE in a manner that conveys its 
primary meaning.” Id. at *8. 
14 See also Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985) (noting 
safeguards in Lanham Act to prevent commercial monopolization of language); Car–
Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting importance 
of “protect[ing] the right of society at large to use words or images in their primary 
descriptive sense”); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 843 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (a trademark “does not confer a right to prohibit the use of the word or 
words.”).  
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to use and incorporate the trademarks in the allegedly-infringing websites. 
See supra at 26-27 & nn.7-8. In contrast, this case involves no use of Adler’s 
marks beyond the mere purchase of keywords, which unlike meta tags, do 
not form part of the defendant’s ads or website. See supra at 17-18.  
The trial court correctly applied these principles to dismiss Adler’s 
complaint. Adler does not cite any case in which trademark infringement 
was based on an ad that displayed only generic terms and did not display 
the plaintiff’s mark.15 As a result, no further review of Adler’s deficient 
pleading was required. In particular, the trial court was not required to 
conduct a pointless analysis of the “digits of confusion” when, as a matter of 
law, no likelihood of confusion was possible based on the facts alleged. See 
Scooter Store, Inc. v. SpinLife.com, LLC, 2011 WL 6415516, at *8, *13 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 21, 2011), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WL 4498904 (S.D. 
Ohio Sept. 28, 2012) (holding that, because the defendant only purchased 
 
15 This is why the Magistrate Judge in this case allowed the Reyes action to proceed in 
part. See supra at 19 n.2; see also Brief at 11, 12, 23. He concluded that the plaintiff’s specific 
allegations in that case about use of the word “Hammer” were sufficient to state a claim 
(RPA.260); there are no such allegations in this case. 
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generic terms as Google AdWords, plaintiff’s trademark infringement 
claims failed as a matter of law and required no likelihood-of-confusion 
analysis because generic terms “are not protectable and cannot infringe 
[plaintiff’s] ‘THE SCOOTER STORE’ mark based on creating consumer 
confusion.”).16 
C. Adler’s conclusory allegations about a “scheme” do not justify 
reversal.  
Faced with strong adverse authority about McNeil’s ad purchases, as 
well as the substance of McNeil’s ads, Adler cites a series of conclusory 
allegations about a “scheme.” See, e.g., Brief at 23.17 The trial court correctly 
 
16 See generally Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999) (noting that a 
district court may resolve a case on “a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue 
presenting no complex question of state law” rather than first addressing “a difficult and 
novel question” of subject-matter jurisdiction”). 
17 See, e.g., Brief at 23 (“Adler alleges McNeil: (1) purchases the Adler Marks for internet 
advertisements targeting consumers searching for Adler on mobile devices because 
consumers are more likely to be confused in the mobile context; (2) uses the Adler Marks 
as keywords for deliberately vague ads with no source identifier so consumers searching 
for Adler will think McNeil’s ad is associated with Adler; (3) uses click-to-call technology 
so as not to reveal the source of the ad and so that consumers searching for Adler will be 
confused and mistakenly call McNeil without realizing she is not Adler or associated with 
Adler; (4) bids increasing higher amounts so that her ads are placed immediately below 
the Adler Marks and before Adler’s ads; and (5) has call-center operators follow scripts 
designed to further confuse callers seeking Adler in the hopes of keeping them on the 
phone, building rapport, and ultimately convincing them to hire lawyers referred 
through McNeil.”).  
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rejected those allegations as inadequate under Twombly and Iqbal as 
interpreted by this Court. (ROA.201-ROA.202.). They provide no reason for 
reversal, for four reasons.  
First, the amount of the bids used to generate the ads, as well as the 
click-to-call technology that supports them (points 3 and 4 on the list in 
Adler’s brief) are just part and parcel of the platform, which Adler conceded 
below was not at issue. (See ROA.154-ROA.155 (“But Adler is not claiming 
McNeil is merely purchasing Adler’s marks as keywords …”)). Nor does 
Adler cite to any authority, legal or otherwise, explaining why the 
incorporation of “click-to-call” technology makes any particular ad more or 
less likely to confuse customers, much less with regard to the misuse of a 
mark protected by the Lanham Act. See generally Waste Mgmnt., Inc. v. AIG 
Spec. Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding pleading inadequate 
when, inter alia, “[plaintiff] did not allege that [defendant] failed to 
investigate, delayed any investigation, misevaluated, misprocessed, made 
any misrepresentation of the policy, or otherwise failed to ‘effectuate’ a fair 
settlement”).  
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Second, Adler does not allege any facts to support his conclusory 
allegation that McNeil’s ads are “confusing” just because they do not 
identify a particular lawyer or law firm (point 2 from Adler’s brief). This 
allegation simply restates Adler’s complaint about McNeil’s display of 
generic terms in her ads, which is not actionable. See supra at 23-28. The same 
is true for Adler’s related claim that “consumers are more likely to be 
confused in the mobile context” about the ads (point 1)—the generic terms 
of the ads are still not actionable, regardless of the user interface. Adler offers 
only speculation as to whether this interface makes the generic terms any 
more, or less, generic. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must 
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”).  
Third, Adler fails to allege any facts to support his allegation about 
misleading statements by McNeil’s “call-center operations” (point 1). Adler 
does not identify any actual misrepresentation made by such a person; to the 
contrary, Adler claims that they “build rapport” with callers, which is 
ordinarily considered desirable. And notably, Adler’s actual pleading of this 
allegation is “on information and belief” (ROA.95 ¶48), which this Court 
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cautions is not a “license to bae claims of fraud on speculation and 
conclusory allegations.” Umbrella Ins. Group, LLC v. Wolters Kluwer, 972 F.3d 
710, 713 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted)  
These speculative allegations fail to state an actionable claim.  
Fourth, while Adler claims that the scheme he alleges is “exactly the 
type of conduct” that some courts have recognized as supporting a claim of 
initial interest confusion (Brief at 14), the key cases he relies on are 
inapposite. For example, Adler cites Earthcam, Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., 49 F. 
Supp. 3d 1210 (N.D. Ga. 2014), which in fact supports the trial court’s 
dismissal. In that case, the district court granted summary judgment on 
Oxblue’s trademark infringement claim that was based on EarthCam’s 
purchase of “oxblue” as a keyword – because Oxblue failed to address or 
present any evidence of a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1241. Oxblue offered 
no evidence of the surrounding context of the screen displaying the disputed 
ads in the search results or “how often customers were lured to the Work 
Zone Cam’s website when they searched for OxBlue on the Internet.” Id. The 
“scheme” described by Adler’s pleading has the same deficiencies.  
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Adler also relies on Alzheimer’s Disease & Related Disorders, but that case 
found that no likelihood of confusion was pleaded by allegations similar to 
Adler’s. 307 F. Supp.3d at 284. That case gives an example of a “clearly 
actionable” bait-and-switch scheme, which is a far cry from what Adler 
alleged: “[I]f AFA had purchased Association Marks as keywords and then 
advertised itself as “Alzheimer's Association,” with nothing in its ad to 
distinguish itself from the Association aside from its URL, this would be a 
clear case of infringement.” Id. The key distinction is that McNeil does not 
“advertise itself” as Adler. Rather, by Adler’s own admission, see supra at 31, 
McNeil’s ads simply contain generic language that might describe any 
personal injury firm. Nothing about Alzheimer’s supports reversal. 
Finally, Adler cites Australian Gold v. Hatfield, in which the defendants 
“used Plaintiffs’ trademarks on Defendants’ Web sites,” while also to using 
the plaintiff’s trademarks in meta tags for its websites and to purchase a 
preferred position on Overture.com. 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006). The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding of trademark infringement, 
but the record before that court was materially different than the one here, 
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and the court did not address whether infringement can occur when 
plaintiff’s trademarks do not appear in defendant’s ads or websites.18 
In sum, rhetoric about a “scheme” is no substitute for an adequate 
pleading. The actual facts pleaded by Adler do not allege violations of the 
Lanham Act, whether labelled as “initial interest confusion” or otherwise. 
The trial court properly dismissed those purported claims and then properly 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 
claims.19 
 
18 Adler cites two other, distinguishable, district-court cases. In TSI Prods., Inc., v. Armor 
All/STP Prods., Co., No. 3:17-cv-1131, 2019 WL 4600310 at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2019), the 
court found that TSI adequately pleaded its trademark infringement claim where the 
trademark was separated by a hyphen from the rest of Defendant Armor All’s 
advertisement. McNeil’s ads do not contain any of Adler’s trademarks, hyphened or 
otherwise. And in Seguros R. Vasquez, Inc. v. Aguirre, No. 19-CV-1484, 2020 WL 3447754, 
(D. Md. June 24, 2020), after recognizing that likelihood-of-confusion is “generally” a fact 
issue in the Fourth Circuit, the court held that the plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim 
for infringement “because he alleged “that the trademark infringement arises from the 
use of that term in the text of the Google advertisement that appears in response to a 
search based on that keyword. The use of a trademark in a Google advertisement, not just 
as a keyword search term, plainly can support a Lanham Act trademark infringement 
claim.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). In contrast, McNeil’s search ads did not display 
Adler’s trademarks. 
19 “A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every 
claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. 
v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). 
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D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying amendment. 
“Denying a motion to amend is not an abuse of discretion if allowing 
an amendment would be futile. An amendment is futile if it would fail to 
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014).  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed 
Second Amended Complaint. Adler repeats its argument about the claimed 
need for a digits-of-confusion analysis, and notes that the Second Amended 
Complaint added references to a customer survey that could be considered 
in such an analysis. See Brief at 43-45. Adler’s argument fails, however, 
because no such analysis should be conducted in the first place. A survey is 
not legally relevant—whether it shows confusion or not—if the alleged 
infringer is not in some way misusing the mark. See supra at 28-29.  
As explained above, the trial court correctly found that no such misuse 
occurred. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that when the Second 
Amended Complaint added allegations about a consumer survey, those 
allegations were not legally relevant because they did not solve the more 
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fundamental problem with Adler’s case. (ROA.308) Put another way, Adler 
cannot bring a cow to a horse race and argue about how swiftly the cow 
might run on the track. The cow is still a cow.  
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment 
below, and grant all other relief to which Appellees may be entitled that is 
consistent with that disposition. 
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